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Abstract 
In this thesis I investigate the role of formal leaders in international negotiations. I 
present theories on the role and influence formal leaders might have in 
international negotiations, and what variation in this role and influence might 
depend on. I then use this theoretical framework to analyse the role of the 
Presidents of the UN Climate Change Conferences in Copenhagen in 2009 and in 
Cancún in 2010, how these differed, how they were perceived by observers such 
as the media and NGO representatives, and if their roles were perceived 
differently, what was their perception of the underlying factors causing this. I 
further analyse these images with the aid of my theoretical framework.  
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List of abbreviations 
AWG Ad-Hoc Working Group 
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CMP Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol 
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IISD  International Institute for Sustainable Development 
MEA Multilateral Environmental Agreement 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation 
ROP Rules of Procedure 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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1 Introduction 
During the final day of the Cancún conference, the President of the COP Patricia 
Espinosa announced the release of new draft decision texts prepared under her 
responsibility, and received a standing ovation (IISD, 2010:FINAL, p. 9). One 
year earlier, Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen was in the same 
position, announcing the release of two final draft texts. Instead of applause, he 
and other state leaders included in the process of creating the texts were accused 
of performing a “coup d’état against the Charter of the United Nations” 
(Dimitrov, 2010, p. 811). 
The Copenhagen conference, which included the 15th Conference of the 
Parties (COP15) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), is often considered a failure. Two weeks of negotiations led 
to “what many consider to be a disappointing Copenhagen Accord that does little 
to ensure that significant actions will be taken to address climate change” 
(Hoffman, 2011, p. 4).  The Cancún conference, which took place a year later, 
was met with a more ambiguous response. Some, such as Dean Bialek, advisor to 
the Marshall Islands delegation, described the negotiations as “gracious and 
fruitful” (Bialek, 2010). Others, like the Swedish journalist Martin Ådahl stated 
that the result was even worse than expected (Ådahl, 2010). 
Attempting to explain why the results differed to the extent that they did, I 
choose to study a factor that quite obviously differed between the two 
conferences, namely the hosts. I examine how the Danish and Mexican 
Presidencies might have influenced the results of the two conferences, and led to 
their different outcomes. I aim to do this by studying how the media and other 
onlookers perceived their effort. Using theories on formal leadership and 
bureaucratic influence I construct an image of what the role of the formal 
chairmanship can be, how the President and the Presidency of a multilateral 
conference can influence events, and why this influence might differ between 
Presidencies. I use the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, emitted daily during 
international environmental negotiations by the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, to build an image of what happened during the two 
conferences. I then use this information to analyse how the media, NGOs, and 
other significant commentators perceived the effort of the Presidencies. Was the 
role of the host nation Presidency perceived as influential? In that case, how and 
why? 
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1.1 Research questions and hypothesis 
What is the role and mandate of the Presidency of UN Climate Change 
Conferences, and in what measure did the Presidency fulfil this role during the 
conferences in Cancún in 2010 and Copenhagen in 2009? 
 
How did the leadership provided by the Presidency of the UN Climate Change 
Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancún affect the outcome of the negotiations? 
 
What was the perceived role of the Presidency during these two conferences, 
and how does this correspond to theories on formal leadership? 
 
To study this I use theories by Biermann & Siebenhüner et. al. on the role of 
international environmental bureaucracies in shaping global environmental policy 
together with Jonas Tallberg’s work on the role of formal chairmanship during 
international negotiations and Joanna Depledge’s descriptive work on the role of 
the Presidency during multilateral negotiations. I apply these theories on empirical 
material consisting of UN documents, such as formal rules of procedure for 
conferences of the parties to the UNFCCC, publications from think tanks and 
other institutes reporting from the conferences, media coverage and scientific 
articles describing what happened during the conferences and why. 
To guide my work, I have formulated the following hypothesis: 
 
Leadership matters in multilateral negotiations. Leadership can yield a great 
deal of influence on the proceedings and outcome of negotiations. It is a 
necessary condition for the success of negotiations, but not a sufficient one. 
Leadership can have a positive influence on negotiations, but can also lead to a 
poor result. Variations in influence can depend both on factors that are internal 
and external to the Presidency.  
 
This hypothesis reflects my expectations when diving into my material. It is 
also founded in the literature on leadership that I use when building my theoretical 
framework. 
1.2 Disposition 
I begin my thesis by explaining my theoretical background, giving account of the 
theories on leadership and bureaucratic influence that I use. Firstly, I present the 
functionalist theory on formal leadership during multilateral negotiations 
presented by Swedish political scientist Jonas Tallberg in the book Leadership 
and Negotiation in the European Union. I then introduce Frank Biermann & 
Bernd Siebenhüner et. al.’s theories on bureaucratic influence in international 
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environmental politics, and make the connection between these two theories.  I 
use Joanna Depledge’s work on diplomatic procedure to link the theoretical 
framework presented by Biermann & Siebenhüner to my cases, which consist of 
temporary negotiation Presidencies, contrary to the more permanent bureaucracies 
they describe. I proceed by describing my methodological approach, which is a 
variation of a comparative case study with an explanatory intention. The 
methodological chapter includes operationalisations of relevant elements of my 
theory. I further present my material, which consists of both primary and 
secondary sources. Then follows an analysis of said material. I direct attention 
towards the common mandate of the President of the Conferences of the Parties to 
the UNFCCC and further describe how the different Presidencies fulfilled their 
mandate, and analyse the differences between them. 
1.3 Limitations 
When writing this thesis, I have a certain explanatory ambition. However, I am 
aware of the limits I am faced with. I have no ambition to provide a complete and 
objective explanation of the subject I am investigating. 
I am faced with practical limits in terms of time and resources. A possible and 
interesting method would be to conduct interviews with officials present both in 
Copenhagen and Cancún, such as people working within the two Presidencies. 
This might have been possible in the case of Copenhagen, but finding equal 
sources in Cancún turned out to be complicated. I therefore deemed it a risk too 
great to take, and decided upon not using interviews as my primary method. 
Recordings exist of all plenary meetings during both conferences, but analysing 
these would also turn out to be a too time consuming task. 
I am using resources for the two conferences that I deem comparable, and 
accessible within the time limit I am confronted with. The sources that I choose to 
use also bring limitations. One cannot say more that what is actually expressed in 
one’s material. The expression might be explicit or not, there is much to be read 
between the lines of a text, but one has to be aware of where to limit one’s 
generalisations. 
1.4 Clarifications 
Much like in the opening segment of most UN treaties and documents, I here 
clarify what is meant when I use particular words and expressions. The “President 
of the COP” or the “COP President” is the one defined in the draft rules of 
procedure for the Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC. When the 
expression President is used, it is the President of the COP that is intended, except 
when other is specified. When using the expression “chair”, I am referring to the 
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theoretical definition of a formal conference chairman, such as the one found in 
Tallberg’s theory on formal chairmanship. “The Secretariat” signifies the 
secretariat of the UNFCCC, unless other is specified. A “Bureaucracy” is the 
theoretical entity described by Biermann & Siebenhüner. The secretariat of the 
UNFCCC is an example of a bureaucracy, but this is not necessarily what is 
meant when I use this expression. When the word “Presidency” is used, I mean 
the part of the leadership of the conference that is handled by the host country in 
question, when other is not specified. This is not to be confused with the COP 
Presidency, which includes all elected presiding officers, such as the chairmen of 
the different working groups. 
The two expressions “The Copenhagen conference” and “the Copenhagen 
summit” both signify the 2009 UN Conference on Climate Change held in 
Copenhagen. This conference included the COP15 (the 15th Conference of the 
Parties to the UNFCCC), but also the CMP5, the fifth session of the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. When 
others use the expression COP15 to signify this conference, I also do so, but in my 
analysis I do not distinguish between the COP and the CMP concerning 
leadership, meaning that this distinction is of no particular significance. The same 
goes for the Cancún conference. 
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2 Theory 
I have chosen to focus on leadership in my analysis of the organisation of the two 
conferences. In this section I present Swedish political scientist Jonas Tallberg’s 
theory on formal leadership of multilateral negotiations. I then complement his 
theories with theories on bureaucratic leadership presented by Frank Biermann & 
Bernd Siebenhüner et. al., and Joanna Depledge. 
2.1 What is leadership? 
To aid the understanding of what I mean by leadership, I choose to divide it into 
three aspects: leadership as a mandate, leadership as a capacity and leadership as 
a process. 
I see leadership as a mandate as the formal right to lead, which is defined by 
the organisation that is to be led. A person that has been elected President of a 
conference is per definition the leader of the negotiations. This leader has certain 
rights that differ from those of other members of the organism that is to be led, 
rights that might be expressed through formally defined rules of procedure. A 
leaders mandate is what one could call leadership a priori, it is what defines a 
leader outside the actual action of leading someone or something, and even 
without someone or something to fill the position as leader. 
Leadership as a capacity is defined by the knowledge, expertise, resources or 
experience that a certain leader possesses. The capacity to lead depends on the 
actual person filling the position as leader. A part of the capacity to lead can also 
be traditions and informal procedure that has emerged within the organisation that 
is to be led, and the ability to use this in the process of leading. One can claim that 
the border between what is a part of a leader’s mandate, and what is his or her 
capacity at times can become blurry; as certain common practices might be so 
frequently used that they eventually are considered part of the mandate. 
Leadership as a process is the action of leading. This can be a combination of 
mandate and capacity, when a leader that is formally given the right to lead, also 
has the capacity to do so, and then pursues to lead whatever is to be led. 
Leadership as a process can also exist without the mandate to lead. This is the 
more informal entrepreneurial leadership that occurs when a certain actor attempts 
to or is successful at leading actions or opinions in a certain direction.  
The kind of leadership that is to be studied here is formal leadership, which 
stems from the mandate to lead. It differs from other kinds of leadership (such as 
informal entrepreneurial leadership) in just that, its formality.  
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I aim to separate leadership as a mandate from leadership as a capacity and 
leadership as a process. Leadership as a mandate will then represent what the two 
host nations have in common. I then attempt to analyse leadership as a capacity 
and leadership as a process in these two cases, using the theoretical framework 
described below. 
2.2 On formal leadership 
In his book Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union, Jonas Tallberg 
presents a functionalist view on the origin of the formal chairmanship of 
multilateral negotiations. Tallberg claims that “[…] the chairmanship as an 
institution in political decision-making should be understood as a functional 
response to collective-action problems in decentralized bargaining” (2006, p. 20). 
Thus, the designation of a chair is an active and rational decision based on 
experience from multilateral negotiations. 
Tallberg directs attention towards the formal leaders of multilateral 
negotiations. He chooses to operationalise leadership as formal chairmanship, 
contrary to other definitions that focus on leading states or other actors that have 
an important influence on the negotiations and thus has or takes a role of a leader. 
He describes the functions that a formal leader serves by directing attention 
towards three central collective-action problems that states experience in 
multilateral negotiations (Tallberg, 2006, p. 2-4). 
The first of these issues is insuperably complex and crowded agendas. There 
are often a vast number of issues to be negotiated during UN conferences such as 
those organised within the UNFCCC. According to negotiation theorists, Tallberg 
states, a cluttered agenda is a major obstacle on the path to an agreement. 
Therefore, agenda management becomes important. The complexity of an agenda 
might be the result of not only a large number of issues to discuss, but also the 
complexity of each issue (Tallberg, 2006, p. 22). As Harvard professor Stavins 
states in a blog post addressing the Climate summit in Copenhagen, the fact that 
nearly 200 states are involved in UNFCCC negotiations does not make it easier to 
navigate an already complex agenda  (Stavins, 2010).  
The task of agenda management thus consists of choosing what is to be 
negotiated, and what is not, and also the structure and order of negotiations. This 
includes the procedural control of the negotiating process, such as giving 
delegates the right to speak, and calling for votes (Tallberg, 2006, p. 24). This 
involves an opportunity to prioritise between different issues. It allows leaders to 
put weight on issues where a negotiable outcome is judged to be within reach, and 
avoid those that can cause irresolvable deadlocks. Good agenda management 
might be the key to successful negotiations. This is achieved by “management of 
people through the creation of system and structure” (Tallberg, 2006, p. 22-23, 
citing Winham, 1977). Tallberg also describes the action of writing and ordering 
the writing of draft negotiating texts as an example of agenda management, as this 
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gathers the negotiations around specific issues deemed negotiable by the 
chairmanship (Tallberg, 2006, p. 195).  
The second and equally important function that a chairman should serve 
according to Tallberg is that of negotiation brokering, to bargain between 
important actors. This is a response to the problem that arises when parties hide 
information about their positions. Of strategic reasons, a negotiating party might 
choose to hide their preferences or not give up information on how far they are 
willing to go to reach an agreement. This permits them to use this information as 
leverage, and obtain a preferable result. But, withholding information also makes 
it more difficult to identify potential zones of agreement. When all actors 
strategically conceal their own position, the result might be that no agreement is 
reached at all (Tallberg, 2006, p. 24-25). 
To solve these problems, a chair is given access to an important source of 
power: information. Through bilateral talks and informal consultations, the chair 
gains information about how far the different parties are willing to go to reach an 
agreement. The chair can then identify an underlying zone of agreement, 
concealed to other negotiating parties. Information about state preferences and 
limitations becomes an important bargaining tool (Tallberg, 2006, p. 29-30). An 
example of brokerage is the formation of smaller negotiating groups on the 
initiative of the chair, such as the “Friends of the Chairman”-group formed under 
the initiative of chair Mustafa Tolba during the ozone negotiations. Tolba 
gathered key negotiating parties in an informal group and was successful in 
creating a draft text that became central in the remainder of the negotiations 
(Tallberg, 2006, p. 198-200).  
A general assumption in Tallberg’s theory is that the chair matters, their work 
can definitely have an influence on the outcome of negotiations. However, he 
explains variations in why, how and how much a chair can influence the output of 
multilateral negotiations simply by variations in the institutional setting and the 
mandate given by the principals, i.e. the negotiating parties. How can one then 
explain that different leaders sometimes perform differently at negotiations when 
they have the same mandate, the same institutional setting and answer to the same 
parties? This is not answered in Tallberg’s, theory, and this is where Biermann et. 
al. enters the equation.  
2.3 On bureaucratic influence 
In their book Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International 
Environmental Bureaucracies, Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner aim to 
explain how an international bureaucracy can influence the political path of the 
organisation it works within, and particularly how come this influence can vary 
between bureaucracies that otherwise work with a similar mandate and similar 
resources (Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009, p. 3-4). This goes beyond Tallberg’s 
theory on formal leadership, as he claims that differences in influence comes from 
structure and mandate. 
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Biermann et. al. define international bureaucracies as “a hierarchically 
organized groups of international civil servants with a given mandate, resources, 
identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal rules of procedures within the context 
of a policy area” (Biermann et. al., 2009, p. 37). For example, an international 
bureaucracy can thus be the secretariat of a treaty, a UN body, agency or program. 
What distinguished the secretariats described by Biermann et. al. from the host 
country Presidency of an international climate conference is its degree of 
permanence. They explicitly state that bodies like “temporary conference 
secretariats” (2009, p. 37) are not a part of what they intend to study. However, I 
consider that the variables they present as explanatory factors to the varying 
influence of different bureaucracies are applicable also in the case of temporary 
conference Presidencies. 
Biermann & Siebenhüner et. al. define the influence of international 
bureaucracies as “the sum of all effects observable for, and attributable to, an 
international bureaucracy”. In terms of leadership as I have chosen to express it, 
this would correspond to what is attributable not to the way the mandate of 
leadership is constructed, but how the leader in question uses its capacity within 
this mandate in the process of leadership, which then leads to certain effects. The 
effects can again be divided into an output, an outcome and an impact (Biermann 
et. al., 2009, p. 41). The output is the result of the bureaucracy’s activities in terms 
of “regulations, policy instruments, compliance mechanisms, and so forth” 
(Young, 2001, p. 114). The outcome is the behavioural effect this has on other 
actors (whether intentional or not), and the impact is the “changes in 
biogeophysical conditions” (Young, 2001, p. 114), or “changes in economic, 
social or ecological parameters that result from the change in actors’ behaviour” 
(Biermann et. al., 2009, p. 41). 
Biermann & Siebenhüner et. al. divide the influence of international 
bureaucracies into three different areas, cognitive, normative and executive 
influence. The last of these, executive influence, is not relevant in the case of 
temporary conference Presidencies, as this translates into the practical assistance 
that international bureaucracies offer in the implementation of treaties and 
agreements, (Biermann et. al., 2009, p. 48), something that temporary 
Presidencies are not engaged in. Cognitive influence, however, is the “influence 
[on] the behavior of political actors by changing their knowledge and belief 
systems”, for example by acting as knowledge brokers. Normative influence is the 
effect international bureaucracies might have “through the creation, support and 
shaping of norm-building processes for issue-specific international cooperation”, 
thus shaping the norms of global environmental governance (Biermann et. al., 
2009, p. 47-48). 
Biermann et. al. state that the influence that international bureaucracies yield 
within these different areas may vary, and attempt to describe what this variation 
depends on. Again they divide the possible influential factors into three clusters; 
“the external problem structure; the polity set by the bureaucracies’ principals 
within which the bureaucrats need to function; and the activities and procedures 
that the staff of the bureaucracies develops and implements within the constraints 
of problem structure and polity framework” (Biermann et. al., 2009, p. 49-50). 
  10 
The external problem structure and the polity are both factors that are determined 
outside the bureaucracies.  
The problem structure can greatly affect the influence that bureaucracies are 
able to yield in a specific field. Different problems demand different resources to 
resolve. Some are complex and multifaceted, with strongly diverging interests 
between the different negotiating parties. Others are less controversial and contain 
less asymmetry concerning interests. The willingness of the parties to resolve a 
problem and put effort and resources into the negotiation of a solution might also 
affect the influence of bureaucracies (Biermann et. al., 2009, p. 51). 
The polity of an international bureaucracy is defined as the “legal, 
institutional, and financial framework” that the bureaucracy works within 
(Biermann et. al., 2009, p. 51). Using the language of the different aspects of 
leadership presented above, polity encompasses what I define as leadership as a 
mandate. Biermann et. al. concludes that the more autonomy a bureaucracy is 
granted, the more influential it is likely to be (2009, p. 53). 
Finally, Biermann et. al. mention the activities and procedures of a 
bureaucracy as the factors that can explain variations in influence depending 
primarily on variables within the bureaucracy. Activities and procedures 
correspond to what I refer to as leadership as a capacity and leadership as a 
process. The capacity being all resources in the form of knowledge, experience, 
routines, etc, and the process being what occurs when these are put in action. The 
difference between these two aspects lies primarily in the spatiotemporal 
dimensions. 
Biermann et. al. divide activities and procedures into four variables: 
organisational expertise, organisational structure, organisational culture and 
organisational leadership. The first of these categories, organisational expertise, 
relates to the processing of knowledge within the bureaucracy. Differences in the 
“ability to generate and process knowledge” (Biermann et. al., 2009, p. 55) can 
have an important impact on the influence the bureaucracy can yield. This relates 
directly to the cognitive influence of a bureaucracy (Biermann et. al., 2009, p. 55). 
The organisational structure of a bureaucracy encompasses its internal 
hierarchy, how division of tasks and responsibilities is managed, and so forth. 
This may vary in level of formalisation, openness, freedom and flexibility, which 
can have an important impact on the efficiency of the bureaucracy (Biermann et. 
al., 2009, p. 55-56). 
Thirdly, the organisational culture within the bureaucracy is also of 
importance. This is defined as “the set of commonly shared basic assumptions in 
the organization that result from previous organizational learning processes and 
include the professional cultures and backgrounds of the staff members”. This is a 
more informal variable that the organisational structure, and can prove difficult to 
measure (Biermann et. al., 2009, p. 56-57). 
Lastly, Biermann et. al. point to organisational leadership as a final influential 
factor. The way executive officers of an organisation conduct their work can be of 
particular importance to the influence of a bureaucracy. When analysing the role 
of temporary host Presidencies, organisational leadership seems to be of particular 
importance. A “strong leader” is one that manages to be flexible and attentive, and 
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maintains a good and dynamic relationship with both the rest of the bureaucracy 
and the organisation it works within. He or she is “charismatic, visionary, and 
popular” (Biermann et. al., 2009, p. 58). This kind of leadership has a positive 
effect on the influence that a bureaucracy can yield on the turn of events. 
2.3.1 Explaining variation in the case of COP Presidencies 
To be able to apply the theory on bureaucratic influence to the cases of temporary 
conference secretariats, I here introduce variables that can affect the influence a 
presiding officer such as the President of the COP has on negotiations. 
According to Joanna Depledge, the presiding officers of a UN Climate Change 
Conference are expected to play an extensive informal role in the reaching of 
agreement. However, the President of the COP is not necessarily the most 
important officer. COP Presidents often play a more ceremonial role, but can also 
choose to take an active role in promoting agreement (2005, p. 36-37). Depledge 
even states that COP Presidents taking a more ceremonial role has often been for 
the best (2005, p. 47-48). 
Depledge points to the same main tasks as Tallberg when specifying how a 
presiding officer (be it the COP President or the Chair of a subsidiary body) is 
expected to work. Examples are building consensus through consulting informally 
with parties, organising meetings between key players, and presenting proposals 
in the form of texts or suggestions for compromises (Depledge, 2005, p. 44-45). 
How well presiding officers perform can be dependent of a number of 
different factors, summarised by Depledge. Firstly, the perceived impartiality of 
the President is essential. This is to be distinguished from neutrality. The 
President is expected to promote a successful outcome the negotiations, not to be 
indifferent to what happens. However, if parties perceive the COP President to 
have a bias towards certain outcome, certain parties or suggestions, this can be 
fatal to the confidence towards the President, and thus also to the influence that 
said President can yield (Depledge, 2005, p. 48-49). 
Secondly, the personality of presiding officers has an impact on their 
performance. A strong personality and an ability to withstand the pressure from 
parties are important factors that make up an influential President (Depledge, 
2005, p. 49-50). 
The experience of big multilateral negotiations is another factor that greatly 
influences the performance of a President. An insight in the dynamics of the 
negotiations is essential to be able to effectively preside. However, the President 
of the COP often lacks the necessary experience. The President is usually elected 
as a result of being environmental minister of the host country, not because he or 
she is considered particularly qualified for the task. Because the President of the 
COP only stays in office for one conference, he or she has no possibility to learn 
from experience. This is partly why the President of the COP can choose to take a 
more ceremonial role, and leave active chairing of the conference to others, such 
as the chair of one of the subsidiary bodies (Depledge, 2005, p. 50-51). A certain 
technical knowledge of the matter that is negotiated is also a necessary quality for 
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a presiding officer. However, this becomes less important at the level of the COP 
President, because most technical details are negotiated at lower levels, such as in 
the subsidiary bodies (Depledge, 2005, p. 51). There is also a great need for 
diplomacy when presiding an international negotiation. The knowledge of what is 
diplomatic procedure as well as the patience to not let frustration take over and 
lead to mistakes and insults to parties is essential (Depledge, 2005, p. 52-53). 
Other factors, such as English skills and nationality can also affect the 
perception and influence of a leader. A developing country President has a 
different position towards the parties compared to a developed country President. 
An ability to communicate fluently in English is important, but as most parties are 
not native English speakers, this is not at all necessary (Depledge, 2005, p. 51-52). 
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3 Methods 
In this section I present the methodological aspects of this thesis. First, I explain 
how my case selection was conducted. Then, I describe the comparative logic 
behind my analysis. I further present my material, how it was collected and how I 
have conducted the analysis of it.  
3.1 Case selection 
Initially, I chose to study the implications of the organisational aspects of 
international negotiations. This idea was sparked after observing the criticism that 
the Danish government received after hosting COP15 in 2009. Certain 
commentators went as far as claiming that the lack of a binding treaty was the 
fault of Denmark, and not the different negotiating parties. Thus, the 2009 United 
Nations Climate Change Conference seemed to be the natural case to study. In 
addition to this, the Copenhagen summit can be considered as a significant case 
within the category of international negotiations. A significant case is, according 
to Jan Teorell and Torsten Svensson a case of particular importance. For example, 
this can be a particularly controversial case, a case that has received much 
attention, or a case that has an important impact on the lives of many people 
(Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 151). The Copenhagen conference is all of this. It 
was a particularly important moment in the history of the climate change regime. 
It gathered nearly 115 Heads of States, one of the largest number of leaders ever 
to meet elsewhere than the United Nations headquarters (UNFCCC, 2013). Nearly 
40,000 people applied for accreditation, either as a delegate or as an observer. 
According to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, “[t]he meeting was subject to 
unprecedented public and media attention”, and the ambition was for the meeting 
to “result in a fair, ambitious and equitable agreement, setting the world towards a 
path to avoid dangerous climate change” (IISD, 2009:FINAL, p. 1). Thus, the 
Copenhagen conference was an event of particular importance within the 
governance of climate change. 
Upon presenting my topic of interest, I was suggested a comparison with the 
next UN Climate Change Conference, which took place in Cancún in Mexico the 
following year. The Cancún Conference was perceived as differing from the one 
in Copenhagen concerning my chosen independent variable, that is the 
organisation. Upon further investigation, I discovered the two cases matched well 
with a comparative study following a most similar design. Below follows a 
description of the comparative logics I have followed. 
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3.2 Comparative logics 
A comparative study aims to investigate a certain issue by comparing two or more 
cases to try to identify patterns. One attempts to copy a sort of experimental logic 
in a situation where one cannot do experiments. For social scientist it is often 
impossible to simulate a scenario. So, instead of doing repeated experiments 
where you add or remove a certain variable which impact you want to examine, 
you study real examples where your variable was or wasn’t present, and compare 
these (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 222). 
When choosing cases, one can follow several different logics, depending on 
what you want to examine. What they have in common is that you distinguish 
between cause and effect, where the cause is referred to as your independent 
variable or variables, that is the “x” that might have caused the situation you’re 
studying. The effect is your dependent variable, the “y” that was caused. Two 
designs for the choice of cases, introduced by John Stuart Mills, have gained great 
support within the social sciences. In the “most similar design” your dependent 
variables differ, but otherwise your cases are quite similar. One attempts to 
identify the one independent variable that also differs between the cases, assuming 
that this then must be the cause of the different outcome (Teorell & Svensson, 
2007, p. 226). The “most different design” leads to a choice of cases that are 
different in all aspects except your dependent variable. To identify the cause one 
looks for an independent variable that the cases also have in common (Teorell & 
Svensson, 2007, p. 227). 
My cases reflect a most similar design. The dependent variable is the outcome 
of the negotiations, and my independent variable is what might have caused 
differences in the outcome. The two are both examples of multilateral climate 
change conferences organised within the same international organisation; the UN. 
They both include a conference of the parties to the same convention, the 
UNFCCC. This means that the secretariat and the Presidency of the two 
conferences act under the same mandate. The two conferences are situated 
relatively close in time, in 2009 and 2010, which could indicate minimal changes 
in actors involved, and also a similar international political climate. The focus of 
my study is the point where these to conferences differ; host country, and 
therefore also Presidency. 
What distinguishes this study from a classic “most similar design” is that 
rather than examining several different possible explanatory causes, independent 
variables, I choose to focus on one that I believe have had an impact on the result 
of the conferences. I then examine whether and how this particular independent 
variable, leadership, might have influenced the outcome. 
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3.3 Material 
I have done a strategic selection of newspaper articles and blog commentaries 
containing references to the role or effort of the host nation during these two 
conferences. My material consists of several different types of sources, both 
primary and secondary, with a varying degree of reliability. The reliability of a 
source is defined by how accurately it describes or measures what you intend to 
describe or measure, in this case the performance of the host nation Presidencies 
during these two conferences. If the information presented in your material has 
inaccuracies that aren’t prone to any particular bias, there is a problem with your 
sources’ reliability. If, however, your sources deliver information that is 
inaccurate with a clear bias in any direction, your problem is one of validity. In 
short, an unreliable source gives relevant but inaccurate information, whereas an 
invalid source gives you accurate information about something slightly different 
that what you intend to describe or measure (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 55-59). 
I am confronted with a problem of validity. Newspaper sources cannot be 
guaranteed to provide complete and valid information on what happened during 
the conferences. One can expect newspapers to be biased towards the spectacular. 
A journalist is not subject to the same demands of accuracy and impartiality as a 
scientific researcher. This led to my decision to use newspaper articles not as 
sources on what actually happened, but as sources on how events were perceived, 
thus also adding another dimension to my analysis, the perceived role of host 
country Presidencies. This also solves my potential problem of reliability. A 
newspaper article on the events of one of the conferences might not be a reliable 
source of information on what actually happened. However, it is an accurate 
description of how the journalist in question perceived the events of the 
conference. 
Firstly, I use the Draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties 
and its Subsidiary Bodies as well as the UNFCCC Handbook to describe the 
formal role of the President of the COP. 
To explain how the Presidencies led the negotiations, I use the Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin published by the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) every day during both conferences. In addition to this I also 
use information from scientific articles describing the conferences, as I judge 
these to be reliable sources. I further use newspaper articles, blog posts and 
reports from think tanks and NGOs to build an image of how these actions were 
perceived. 
Through these articles, I build an image of how the effort of the two host 
nations was perceived by onlookers such as journalists and NGO representatives. 
Then, I pursued to analyse the perceived image using the theoretical framework 
on leadership presented in the previous chapter. 
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3.4 Operationalisations 
I measure the success of the conferences with reference to the official objectives 
presented in the Bali roadmap, as well as whether the IISD characterised the 
conference as a success in their Earth Negotiations Bulletins, and how the result 
of the conferences was described in scientific articles. I will not myself do a 
normative analysis of whether the results were good or bad. When referring to 
good or bad leadership, this will be based on the perception of the quality of 
leadership reflected in reports, the media, and negotiating parties’ statements. 
“Good” or “bad” leadership refers to whether it sparked positive or negative 
reactions, and whether the actions of the leader correspond to what is defined as 
good or bad leadership in my theoretical framework. 
Tallberg further refers to brokerage, as a function demanded of a chairman. 
This might include the act of writing text-proposals and organising talks in 
smaller negotiating groups to facilitate negotiations. I operationalise the first as 
the actual formulation of texts separate from, but possibly related to or based on 
formal text-proposals already on the negotiating board. Only text drafted by the 
host country Presidency or under its responsibility or initiative are to be taken into 
account, as it is the influence of the host nation that is the object of study. 
The second aspect of negotiation brokerage is the organisation of informal 
meetings with key parties. Negotiating in plenary sessions with nearly 200 parties 
present is a highly complex and difficult task. Discussing matters in smaller 
groups is a possible solution to this problem, and something that has been done at 
several multilateral negotiations. I operationalise this act of brokerage as the 
organisation of separate negotiating groups with a limited number of 
representatives from a limited number of parties (requested or suggested by the 
COP Presidency). These are not to be confused with the already existing working 
groups that also hold negotiating sessions during COPs. The groups that I here 
intend to study are the ones organised on the initiative of the COP President or 
other host country actors that are separate from regular or other semi-permanent 
negotiating groups. 
How a problem is structured is not something that the Presidency can affect, 
but something external. It depends on the problem itself and the relation that the 
parties have to it. However, differences in problem structure might affect the 
degree of influence a Presidency may enjoy. Therefore, I will not at first hand 
analyse the problem structure but rather give a short account of how the structure 
of what faced the different Presidencies might have changed. 
I operationalise problem structure as a combination of the different positions 
the parties have and how the disagreements surrounding the issue are structured, 
and what was expected of the two meetings according to the Bali roadmap that 
describes the goals for environmental negotiations in the immediate future, a 
definition that is influenced by the description provided by Biermann & 
Siebenhüner et. al.  
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4 Analysis 
This segment combines the theoretical background on leadership with the material 
described above. I follow the structure of my theoretical chapter, meaning that I 
start by describing the a priori of these leadership positions, their mandate, which 
is what they have in common. I then continue to explain how they differ. I give a 
brief description of what happened during each conference and the actions of the 
Presidency, thus describing the leadership process. Then I direct focus towards 
the explanation of why they acted differently, drawing on articles and opinions on 
the different qualities the two Presidencies possess, seen through the theoretical 
lens provided by Tallberg, Biermann & Siebenhüner et. al, and Depledge. I 
distinguish certain main topics that are reflected in the reporting from each 
conference, and compare the description of these aspects to what is expressed in 
the bulletins from IISD. I continue to analyse these using my theoretical base, 
aiming to identify elements explaining how the Presidencies might have 
influenced the outcome of negotiations found both in the Earth Negotiations 
Bulletins and in articles and opinions. I thus analyse the process of leadership was 
perceived, aiming to distinguish the capacity to lead within the two different 
Presidencies. 
4.1 The mandate of the COP President 
Being chosen to organise a UN Climate Conference comes with a certain mandate 
and certain resources. These are the same for most Presidencies, but when they 
vary it is often not something the host country has any control over. These 
factors/variables are what I refer to as the a priori of leadership in the case of the 
Presidency of the UN Climate Change conferences. 
According to the Draft Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties 
and its Subsidiary Bodies, the President of the Conference of the Parties is elected 
during the first meeting of the session (UNFCCC, 1996, Rule 22). The office of 
the President normally rotates between the five UN regional groups. Usually, the 
President of the COP is the environmental minister of the government of his or 
her country. During a Conference of the Parties, the President will not at the same 
time act as representative for his or her Party, he or she is to act impartially 
(UNFCCC, 2006, p. 31). The President performs several procedural duties, such 
as opening and closing sessions, give permission to speak, call for votes, 
announce decisions and, in short, “have complete control of the proceedings and 
over the maintenance of order thereat”. But, the President “remains under the 
authority of the Conference of the Parties” (UNFCCC, 1996, Rule 23). 
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4.2 Process: What happened during the two 
conferences? 
Through the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, one can get a certain impression of the 
role of the Presidency during the negotiations. 
4.2.1 Summary of the Copenhagen conference 
Monday the 7th of December 2009, thousands of diplomats, press representatives, 
UN officials and members of NGOs gathered in Copenhagen for the beginning of 
the largest UN-summit ever held. According to the Bali Action Plan, which 
contained the Bali roadmap, negotiations for a climate treaty replacing the Kyoto 
protocol were to be concluded in Copenhagen (IISD, 2009:1, p. 1). 
During the conference, negotiations progressed slowly. The trust for host 
country Denmark was undermined early on, when the newspaper The Guardian 
leaked a draft “Danish text”, which was particularly opposed by developing 
countries. When heads of state arrived for the high level segment, there was still a 
lot of work to be done. After nearly two weeks of intense negotiations, a draft text 
was written by a “friends of the chair”-group working behind closed doors. 
Several countries opposed this document. According to political scientist 
Radoslav Dimitrov, “[c]ountries opposing the Copenhagen Accord gave two 
primary reasons for doing so: the weak policy content, and the allegedly 
“undemocratic” and “illegitimate” procedure through which it was created” 
(Dimitrov, 2010, p. 810). 
The conference resulted in the extension of the mandate of both the text 
drafting ad-hoc working groups, transferring their work to the next conference, in 
accordance with the draft rules of procedure (IISD, 2010:1, p. 2 & UNFCCC, 
1996, Rule 16). 
4.2.2 The Danish Presidency 
During the first day of the Copenhagen conference, Danish Climate minister 
Connie Hedegaard was elected COP President. In addition to her formal 
procedural duties, I have distinguished three different categories of action. 
The first is the act of engaging in consultations with parties. An example is 
when Hedegaard proposed the establishment of a contact group on the subject of 
proposals for new protocols under the UNFCCC that had been received from 
several different countries. As there was no agreement on this subject, Hedegaard 
stated that she would consult informally on the issue (IISD, 2009:4, p. 1). This 
also serves as an example of the second category of action, namely the suggestion 
of particular activities. The third is the announcement of particular activities 
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conducted by the Danish Presidency, such as the introduction of separately written 
draft texts. 
As heads of states from the different negotiating Parties arrived in 
Copenhagen, President Hedegaard resigned as COP President to give place to 
Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen. Some saw this as a dramatic 
event, believing that it might be the result of some conflict, but in reality it was 
more of a question of procedure (IISD, 2009:10, p. 3). 
4.2.3 Summary of the Cancún conference 
When diplomats from all over the world gathered in Cancún in December 2010, 
they did so with modest expectations (IISD, 2010:FINAL, p. 1). After what was 
seen as failure in Copenhagen, an important task during the Cancún conference 
became to restore faith in the UN system’s ability to solve the problems of climate 
change (IISD, 2010:FINAL, p. 28). This also made parties eager to prove that 
they had not lost the ability to reach an agreement (C2ES, 2010). Issues of 
transparency had been a major topic during COP15 and the Mexican Presidency 
worked hard to ensure that the negotiating process was perceived as democratic 
and open. COP President Espinosa repeated on several occasions that maintaining 
transparency was highly prioritised, and that no Mexican text was to be 
introduced (IISD, 2010:FINAL, p. 28). One step taken to reach this was 
introducing informal stocktaking plenary sessions to inform all parties of the 
progress made in de different formal and informal working groups (IISD, 
2010:FINAL, p. 2). 
Some faith was restored in the UNFCCC after the conclusion of the Cancún 
conference. It was characterised by small but important progress. Decisions were 
made on several points, “and contain provisions on adaptation, REDD+, 
technology, mitigation and finance” (IISD, 2010:FINAL, p. 1). However, some 
decisions were also postponed to future conferences (IISD, 2010:FINAL, p. 29). 
4.2.4 The Mexican Presidency 
The role of Espinosa during the Cancun conference was in certain aspects quite 
similar to that of Hedegaard and Rasmussen in Copenhagen. In other ways, it 
differed substantially. COP President Espinosa also performed the duties of a 
President, such as chairing the plenary discussions. She consulted informally with 
the parties and took the initiative to the formation of negotiating groups and other 
negotiating strategies. An example of the first is when Espinosa suggested that 
ministers were to be paired, one from a developed and one from a developing 
country, to work together on specific issues (IISD, 2010:8, p. 4). 
Unlike the Danish COP Presidents, Espinosa did not introduce a Mexican text. 
On the contrary, UNFCCC executive secretary announced that there would be no 
Mexican text (IISD, 2010:6, p. 4), and Espinosa repeated this on several occasions 
(IISD, 2010:11, p. 3). At the very end of the Cancún conference, Espinosa 
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announced the release of new texts drafted under her responsibility. This led to 
her receiving a standing ovation, a clear sign that parties appreciated her effort as 
the President of the COP (IISD, 2010:FINAL, p. 15). 
4.3 Process and capacity 
I present a number of central elements in the work of the COP Presidencies and 
how these were perceived. 
4.3.1 Informal consultations 
The act of engaging in informal consultations is something that is referred to often 
in relation to both conferences. The two Presidents of the Copenhagen conference 
talk about engaging in informal consultations on a wide range of issues such as 
the election of officers (IISD, 2009:2, p. 2), forming contact groups on particular 
issues (IISD, 2009:4, p. 1), and are even reported to be “consulting on how to 
conduct consultations” (IISD, 2009:FINAL, p. 4). Concerning the Cancún 
conference, however, there are less reports of the COP President herself 
conducting informal consultations (IISD, 2010). Not only the President consults 
informally. Chairs of different working groups and delegates from different 
nations are also cited to be consulting informally throughout the entire 
conferences. 
According to Tallberg, holding informal consultations is one of the tools 
available to formal chairs that permit them to gain access to knowledge about the 
positions of parties that is otherwise unavailable. This knowledge permits the 
chair to act as a broker. 
The creation of separate negotiating groups, such as a “friends of the chair”-
group is a form of informal consultation conducted in more organised forms. The 
possible creation of a “friends of the chair”-group was suggested by Danish COP 
President Connie Hedegaard, as a forum for the negotiation of a final treaty 
document (IISD, 2009:11, p. 4). The creation of such a group was met with a 
positive response by some parties, but was also criticised by a group of 
developing countries that saw this as a threat to transparency (IISD, 2009:FINAL, 
p. 28). Eventually, a “friends of the chair”-group was created, consisting of 
several heads of state. It was in this group that the final text that was to become 
the Copenhagen Accord was negotiated (IISD, 2009:FINAL, p. 28 & Dimitrov, 
2010, p. 809-810). 
The creation of the “friends of the chair”-group became an important theme 
during the Copenhagen conference (Dimitrov, 2010, p. 809). Journalist Martin 
Khor was one of those that directed harsh criticism towards the group. He refers 
to it as a “hijacking” of the negotiations, and states that one should “[b]lame 
Denmark […] for Copenhagen failure” (Khor, 2009). After the “friends of the 
chair”-negotiations were over, the resulting document also received harsh 
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criticism, going as far as one delegate comparing it to the Holocaust (Dimitrov, 
2010, p. 811). 
Espinosa also received criticism for engaging in informal consultations during 
the Cancún conference. UN Youth delegate Anjali Appadurai comments on the 
existence of informal consultations with scepticism. She claims that they’re “not 
considered legally appropriate”. However, she does not refer to who considers this 
and why. She mentions the informal dinner held at the arrival of certain ministers 
to Cancún, and implies that the dinner was held in secrecy (Appadurai, 2010). The 
same dinner was however mentioned by the IISD, which simply stated that an 
informal dinner was held, without further comments (IISD, 2010:7, p. 4). 
According to Dean Bialek, a negotiator for the Marshall Islands, Espinosa also 
convened a group of key actors to discuss the last details of the final text 
proposals during the final stages of the Cancún conference. Bialek states that 
“every international negotiator knows that at some point during a complex and 
politically charged multilateral process, a small, humid room is necessary to 
crunch the final deal” (Bialek, 2010). However, this meeting was not explicitly 
mentioned in by the IISD. 
Bialek represents a view that differs radically to that of Appadurai, one that 
resembles the understanding of informal consultations reflected in my theoretical 
framework. Whether informal consultations should be considered good or bad, 
legal or illegal, the surprise expressed by Appadurai points to an inequality in the 
access to information about common negotiating procedure. Similarly, when Khor 
criticises the creation of a “friends of the chair”-group, he does not mention that 
this is a common negotiating tool. This lack of transparency, not only by holding 
closed meetings, but particularly the lack of knowledge of such meetings, is one 
that might lead to distrust towards the climate regime. 
As already mentioned, Espinosa held stocktaking plenary sessions during the 
Cancún summit to increase transparency. This points to awareness and openness 
concerning the problems that are associated with extensive informal consultations. 
 
4.3.2 Writing draft texts 
The writing of a ”Danish text” caused much debate and received strong 
criticism during the Copenhagen conference. During the first week, the British 
newspaper The Guardian leaked a draft document presented as “the ‘Danish text’” 
(The Guardian, 2009). According to the newspaper, this caused developing 
nations to react strongly. John Vidal quotes negotiators and NGO representatives 
that heavily criticises both the content of the text and how it was written, and 
states that “developing countries reacted furiously to [the] leaked documents”. A 
senior diplomat was cited claiming that the document “is to be superimposed 
without discussion on the talks" (Vidal, 2009a). The Climate Action Network also 
commented the leakage, stating that “[s]omething really WAS rotten in 
Denmark”, and describe the text as unambitious, and the process behind its 
development as “fatally flawed”. (ECO, 2009, p. 1). 
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The leakage was also commented by the IISD. They report of strong reactions 
from certain actors, but states that “most veterans and observers close to the 
process were more interested in knowing “which version” of the text was leaked”, 
indicating that the existence of a Danish text was not at all a secret to many 
delegates (IISD, 2009:3, p. 4). Danish journalist Per Meilstrup even claims that 
UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon gave Denmark an informal mandate to bring 
forth such a text (Meilstrup, 2010, p. 124-125).  
Albeit the heavy criticism, at her resignation, COP President Hedegaard 
announced that a complete Danish draft would be presented in the coming days 
(IISD, 2009:10, p. 1). This was met with critical questions from several parties, 
including China who questioned the transparency concerning the drafting of these 
texts, and stated that “the Presidency could not “put forward text from the sky”” 
(IISD, 2009:10, s. 1). 
Contrary to the Danish, President Espinosa of the Cancún conference 
continuously repeated that there was no Mexican text. However, on the last day of 
the conference, she presented several texts “under her responsibility”. She stated 
that these texts reflected the negotiating tracks, and were not to be seen as a 
“Mexican text” (IISD, 2010:FINAL, p. 15). This claim is similar to the one 
presented by Hedegaard, that the texts that were to be presented were “based 
substantially on the two texts forwarded by the AWGs” (IISD, 2009:10, p. 1). 
Nonetheless, Espinosa received standing ovations for her statement, as opposed to 
the critical questions and accusations directed towards the Danish COP 
Presidency.  
The writing of separate text proposals is presented both by Jonas Tallberg and 
Joanna Depledge as a common practice within the climate regime. It is an 
important tool in negotiation facilitation, used by many successful conference 
chairs, such as Mustafa Tolba in the Ozone negotiations (Tallberg, 2006, p. 198-
200). However, the repeated reference to the text as the “Danish text” indicates 
that it is not seen as an impartial contribution to the negotiations. According to 
Depledge, impartiality is a very important quality of a presiding officer. 
4.3.3 Expressions of trust – and distrust 
When the efforts of the Danish hosts of the Copenhagen conference are 
mentioned, they are often set in a bad light. In an article compiled by Suzanne 
Goldenberg, John Vidal comments on the Danish Presidency, describing it as an 
embarrassment. He points to Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen’s poor effort as 
COP President during the high level segment of the negotiations, and connects 
this to his inexperience of such high level politics. Hedegaard, however gets a 
better review. He also claims that a conflict between Rasmussen and Hedegaard 
lay in the background when Hedegaard stepped down as COP President, the 
official reason being that a change of leadership was needed when such a high 
number of heads of state arrived in Copenhagen (Vidal, 2009b). Vidal even 
brought up the Danish text proposal that was leaked in the beginning of 
negotiations, pointing out that it lead to furious reactions from developing 
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countries. Danish journalist Per Meilstrup also heavily criticises the Presidency, 
and also points to inexperience and a weak understanding for UN procedure as a 
reason for the Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen’s failure to lead the negotiations 
(Meilstrup, 2010, p. 130). This corresponds to Depledge’s description of the skills 
needed to effectively chair a UNFCCC negotiation. Experience is essential, and is 
something that the President of the COP often lacks (Depledge, 2005, p. 50-51). 
Despite this lack of experience, Rasmussen chose to take an active role, which is 
voluntary according to Depledge (2005, p. 36-37).  
Something that is reoccurring in articles and reports from the Cancún summit 
is the expression of a positive view of the Mexican hosts, and a praising of their 
efforts. Bruno Berthon lists important players in the debate on climate change, and 
starts with Espinosa. He describes her as “the central figure” at the negotiations. 
The article is written at the very beginning of the conference; the author states that 
she has already given a good impression of Mexico as a host nation. It is not given 
that the President of the negotiations is presented as the main figure.  At previous 
conferences, the chair of a working group or a subsidiary body has had a more 
central role, and is the name one refers to when talking about the “chair” or when 
discussing formal leadership during that particular conference. An example is 
Raul Estrada who led the Kyoto conference as the chair of an ad-hoc working 
group (Tallberg, 2010, p. 257). Estrada is often used as an example of effective 
leadership. Contrarily, one does not often hear the name of the Japanese President 
Ohki of the very same conference. As Depledge states, it is a choice whether the 
President of the COP takes a visible role during negotiations, and in Kyoto, the 
Japanese chose to let Estrada take the role of the chair (2005, p. 48). 
This shows that being the President of the negotiations does not automatically 
make you the leader. The President officially leads negotiations according to the 
UNFCCC rules of procedure, but taking a leading role in negotiations is not 
given, it is a choice for each country or leader to make.   
Heather Allen, of Natural Resources Defense Council, an NGO, writes about 
an early morning plenary session held at the very beginning of the high level 
segment of the Cancún conference. The different working groups presented new 
text proposals. Then, Espinosa did a move that Allen considers strategic. Instead 
of letting all countries speak and voice their opinion on the texts, she rapidly 
closed the meeting, expressing that further decisions were political ones and for 
the ministers to make. The author expresses confidence in Espinosa’s authority, 
and sees this move as an effective way of managing the time-issue that arises 
when nearly 200 parties are to speak (Allen, 2010). Another possible angle would 
be to frame this as a democratic problem, stating that parties should have the 
opportunity to express themselves. But, in this case, the Mexican hosts managed 
to skip this step without being accused of leading an undemocratic process. 
The decisiveness described by Allen was also reflected in the handling of 
Bolivia’s protests against the conference outcome. Bolivia made several 
complaints concerning the procedure behind the drafting of the final texts, and put 
itself in the way of reaching consensus. Instead of accepting failure in negotiating 
a result that would be formally adapted, Espinosa stated that “[c]onsensus does 
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not mean that one country has the right of veto”, and declared consensus despite 
Bolivia’s protests (IISD, 2010:FINAL, p. 28). 
Dean Bialek, an advisor to the Marshall Islands delegation at the Cancún 
conference, praises the Mexican Presidency, and gives it credit for what he 
defines as a success in Cancún. He describes Mexico’s style of negotiation as 
“gracious”. He credits “Patricia Espinosa, and her impressive team of diplomats” 
with what he describes as a success in Cancún. Even Martin Ådahl, who deeply 
criticises the Cancún summit in his article Till och med värre än väntat, (Even 
worse than expected), states that the failure in Cancún happened despite the 
efforts of the host country. He sees the Mexicans as calm hosts that were focused 
on small steps forward rather than big ambitious goals of saving the world, and 
states that Mexico is right when claiming that such small steps forward were taken 
(Ådahl, 2009). 
Appadurai also expresses a general trust in the Mexican Presidency in her blog 
post titled Always trust your Mexican. However, her trust seem to be of a different 
nature, more of a hope that President Espinosa will succeed in maintaining 
transparency, combined with a determinist approach when stating that “[a]s 
observers in this process, all we may do at this point is “trust our Mexican.””.  
All of these commentators point to what Biermann et. al. refer to as 
organisational leadership. Their description of the Mexican Presidency and 
Espinosa’s role corresponds to that of strong leadership, both according to 
Biermann et. al. and Depledge.  
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5 Conclusion 
I conclude by referring again to my initial research questions: 
 
What is the role and mandate of the Presidency of UN Climate Change 
Conferences, and in what measure did the Presidency fulfil this role during the 
conferences in Cancún in 2010 and Copenhagen in 2009? 
 
How did the leadership provided by the Presidency of the UN Climate Change 
Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancún affect the outcome of the negotiations? 
 
What was the perceived role of the Presidency during these two conferences, 
and how does this correspond to theories on formal leadership? 
 
The President of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC has a clear 
mandate stipulated in the Draft Rules of Procedure of the COP to the UNFCCC. 
He or she is to preside over the negotiations, accord delegates the right to speak 
and call for voting. In addition to this formal and near ceremonial mandate, the 
President of the COP has an informal right to play a more active role in the 
promotion of an agreement. This includes bargaining between actors, engaging in 
informal consultations, drafting text proposals and organising meetings with key 
actors. 
During the Copenhagen conference, Connie Hedegaard and Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen both acted as President of the COP. Hedegaard during the initial 
segment, and Rasmussen during the high level segment of the conference. 
Hedegaard performed well in her formal more ceremonial duties as President of 
the COP. Rasmussen, however, received criticism for not having a great enough 
understanding of UN procedure. Concerning the more informal role of the 
President of the COP, the Danish Presidency didn’t perform as well. The Danish 
hosts received much criticism for the lack of transparency during negotiations, 
and the introduction of a so-called “Danish text”. 
The COP President of the Cancún conference, Patricia Espinosa, performed 
well in her formal duties. She was also praised for her effort performing the more 
informal duties of the President of the COP. She managed to maintain a good 
level of transparency, was a strong and consistent leader when needed, and 
received a standing ovation for her effort in drafting a text during the final hours 
of the conference. 
One can assume that Espinosa’s leadership had a positive effect on the 
outcome of the Cancún conference. It was under her lead that the final texts 
reflecting the two negotiating tracks were drafted. She also put her foot down 
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when Bolivia stood in the way of consensus. These are all actions that according 
to Depledge correspond the role of a strong and influential President of the COP. 
On the contrary, the Danish Presidency was perceived to have affected the 
outcome of the negotiations negatively. The Danish hosts attempted to use the 
traditional tools of a COP President, such as the drafting of text proposals and the 
organisation of separate negotiating groups with key actors. However, their efforts 
were perceived as attempts to impose the view of a minority of the parties in an 
un-democratic way, rather than impartial attempts of negotiation brokering. It is 
difficult to determine whether the results of the conference would have been any 
better without the influence of the Danish Presidency, but according to the results 
of my studies, I judge it safe to assume that the Danish Presidency didn’t bring a 
great positive influence on the results of the Copenhagen conference. 
The President of the COP is perceived to play an important role in the United 
Nations Climate Change Conferences. In the case of the Copenhagen conference, 
those who mentioned the efforts of the host nation indicated that Denmark was 
partly (or fully) to be blamed for what was perceived as a failed conference. The 
role of the Mexican Presidency was equally presented as an influential one, 
although in the opposite direction. This reflects what is expressed in my 
theoretical framework. However, many authors express a view on the role of the 
President of the COP that does not match what is stated by Tallberg, Biermann & 
Siebenhüner et. al. and Depledge. The drafting of text proposals, informal 
consultations and the organising of separate negotiating groups with key actors is 
several times referred to as illegitimate and undemocratic actions that have no 
place in UN negotiations. It is legitimate for onlookers to criticise the course of 
actions during negotiations, but as times those who presented the criticism seemed 
to have no knowledge of the fact that these actions have become so common that 
they are presented as an essential part of the role of a leader of international 
negotiations. Tallberg presents the appointment of a leader to perform precisely 
these tasks as functionalist solution to a collective action problem that arises in 
international negotiations, such as the Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC, 
thus describing this kind of negotiation brokering as the central function of a 
negotiation chair. Depledge states that this informal role is “accepted – and often 
expected – of a presiding officer in promoting the reaching of agreement” 
(Depledge, 2005, p. 36). 
I thus conclude by partly confirming my hypothesis. Leadership matters, and it 
mattered in particular during the Cancún conference, when COP President Patricia 
Espinosa exerted a strong form of leadership that led to visible effects in the 
outcome of the negotiations. However, in the case of the Copenhagen conference, 
it is difficult to visualise what would have been achieved with a different 
leadership using only the material I have chosen. I choose not to assume that not 
leading negotiations towards success is equal to leading them towards failure. 
Nonetheless, a perception that the Danish Presidency contributed to the failure of 
the Copenhagen conference is definitely observable. 
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